We, the Defective Commodity-Beings by NAGAHARA Yutaka
We, the Defective Commodity-Beings
著者 Nagahara Yutaka









We, the Defective Commodity-Beings1
Yutaka Nagahara*
Faculty of Economics, Hosei University
Abstract
The main aim of this text is to reconstruct an ontic (and therefore ontological) theory of the event qua
value-theory.  For this attempt, I base my arguments on a re-reading of Capital.  The “events” posited in this
re-theorization of Capital are “translated/transferred” into three commencements from which logical descrip-
tions of capital in Capital appear to start respectively yet interrelatedly.  As a theoretical procedure, I disartic-
ulate a single theoretical commencement of Capital – i.e. a commodity – into three commencements (-qua-
events), and decipher their inter-relations.  The first commencement/event is, as is usual with the currently
ordinary understanding of Capital, the commodity posited at its very outset, which turns out to be a capitalist
commodity in the course of my elucidation in this text.  The second is the so-called originary accumulation of
capital which has been and still is regarded as a historical origin/invention of capital-ism but is retrospectively
crossed out from and for the first commencement that regards itself as solely legitimate: violent expropriation.
The third is the exchange (process), which is incorporated into the first as the peaceful contractual transaction
among so-called equal “owners,” which is usually called exploitation.  In so doing, I try to de-logicalize the
purely logical descriptions of Capital upon which capital arrogates its logicality and circularity to itself, while
at the same time avoiding a simple and naïve historicization of Capital. In this way, I try to ontologize the
second and third commencements-qua-events as ontic agents in order to subvert the commandment of capital
based on the first commodity.
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1. The Arché that ought to be Contaminated
Nous ne sommes donc pas sortis du cercle d’une seule et même qu estion:
si nous avons pu, sans en sortir, ne pas tourner dans un cercle, c’est que
ce cercle n’est pas le cercle clos de l’idéologie, mais le cercle perpétuel-
lement ouvert par ses clôtures mêmes, le cercle d’une conaissnace fondée
(Althusser, 1996, p.79).
In this text, I attempt to pluralize the theoretical arché2 of Capital into three interconnected
dimensions. This is in order to de-hegemonize the commodity that is posited at its very outset,3 a
commodity that is logically supposed to solely and preemptively “ordain” the whole description of
Capital.  In short, I attempt to posit “das Verschwindende [the vanished]” not as “das
Aufgehobene [the sublated]” (Hegel, 1969a, p. 112) but as, following Hegel himself, “etwas Un-
voll-kommenes [something imperfect/something that is not-fully-to-come]” which is, nevertheless,
to be “condemned/reprimanded [rügen]” by the “proximate truth [nächste Wahrheit]” that is
alleged to finally emerge and firmly complete its logical circularity.4 For this attempt, however,
Althusser, not Hegel, must come first.
The Althusserian circle quoted above cannot be composed simply of a commencement that
departs from the whole while securely anticipating a “clôture” by its necessary – precisely speak-
ing, necessitated – return to the point of departure, because a circle, even according to its most
relaxed definition, is inevitably conditioned both upon a pre-supposed unity between its departing-
point and returning-point, on the one hand, and its eventual – and/or evental (Badiou, 1988) –
vanishing of the commencement, on the other. Thus, it is, by definition, non-sensical to emphasize
its “clôture” as a circle.  In other words, the Althusserian “clôture” im-pli-cates a certain opening –
lack of suture – in the sense that the logical circle made possible by “clôture” is closed while at the
same time disclosing, and vice versa.
Starting from this vista, I re-interpret the Althusserian quasi-circle as a defective circle
[fehlerhaften Kreislauf] (Marx, 1962, p. 741), which is usually translated as a “vicious circle”
(Marx, 1996, p. 704) or a “never-ending circle” (C1, p. 873) .5 Here the commencement inaugurat-
ing the logical circle of Capital, strictly due to a pre-supposition [Voraus-setzung] anticipating its
necessary “clôture” to come, in and for itself, undoes a logical circle, and as a result, contaminates
its logical circularity while retaining its logicality.  That is to say that the commencement is initiat-
ed only as accepting its being always already contaminated and in this sense deficient.6
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2 The word “arché (arkhē)” is derived from “arkheion,” which connotes the commencement and the commandment at
once. Derrida wrote as follows. “Arkhē, we recall, names at once the commencement and the commandment. This name
apparently coordiates two principles in one: the principle according to nature or history, there where things commence –
physical, historical, or ontological principle – but also the principle according to the law, there where men (my emphases)
and gods command, there where authority, social order are exercised, in this place from which order is given – nomologi-
cal principle” (Derrida, 1996, p. 1).  See also Arendt (1958, pp. 222ff.) and Arendt (1961, passim).
3 Hegel calls this beginning “Aufgenommenes” (Hegel, 1969b, p. 553). It is literally something “picked up” and the
English translation of Logik renders it “something assumed” (Hegel, 1969d, p. 827).
4 I quote in full because I would force Hegel’s statement to stand on its hands: “Indem nun diese Bestimmtheit die
nächste Wahrheit des unbestimmten Anfang ist, so rügt sie denselben als etwas Unvollkomenes, sowie die Methode selbst,
die von demselben ausgehend nur formell war” (Hegel, 1969b, p.567, my italics), which is rendered in the English transla-
tion as “Now as this determinateness is the proximate truth of the indeterminate beginning, it condemns the latter as some-
thing imperfect as well as the method itself that, in starting from that beginning, was merely formal” (Hegel, 1969d, p. 839).
5 Hereafter, I basically rely on the Penguin version (Marx, 1976a) for quotations with the abbreviation C1. When
inserting the German original with brackets, I use Marx (1962).
6 The Althusserian circle thus understood is very Spinozan. Spinoza criticizes the usual definition of the circle and
redefines it as “the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other free” (Spinoza, 1990, 96:2).
Relying on this Spinozan definition (see footnote 6), I aim to elaborate both the theoretical
status of the commencement(s) of the defective circle clandestinely and yet indispensably embed-
ded in capital’s would-be logical self-description qua autós (including its historical development)
and the specific ways of covering up this quasi-autós associated with the former, only through
which might one encounter the potency of the working class to implode this eternal circularity
ontically.
Althusser, while providing us with overdetermination as a method which is destined to be
“reproached” by the “proximate truth” in the end, probes this disseminative dispositif that renders
a defective circulation possible and finds the “connaissance fondée” that cannot be but “the soli-
tary hours of the ‘last instance’” which, nevertheless, “never comes” (Althusser, 1986, p. 113).
However, we must not overlook the fact that in the background is the Althusser who struggles to
censure “the Hegelian circle for having only a single centre in which all the figures are reflected
and conserved,” as Gilles Deleuze shows in his discussion of the three types of theatre – tragedy,
farce, and choros (Deleuze, 1968, p. 73), and it is this inextricably tangled tripartite stage that is
precisely what I am about to decode in relation to the three commencements, all of which except
for one are to be belatedly erased in Capital.
In order to delineate how this tripartite theoretico-methodological régime or the triumvirate of
commencements in Capital works, I will push the Althusserian struggle forward by disseminating
the “connaissance fondée [fonder/fundus],” on which any possible commencements can depend, to
its maximum degree of ambi-valence.
If the foundation [fundus] incorporates the disseminative dispositif, or, relying on the reading
of Spinoza above, if there is an embedded openness in the so-called clôture “described by any line
whereof one end is fixed and the other free,” this is only insofar as the foundation is an inaugura-
tion [fundus] of commencement as an assemblage of the three ad/e-vents7 or contingencies-qua-cli-
namen (Deleuze, 1968, p. 238; cf., Markovits, 1974; Serre, 1977).  This is equal to emancipating
“the last instance” not only from the “solitary hours” but also from itself and breaks out towards
the event.  Furthermore, at the kernel of this attempt there remains a procedural schema devoted to
the logical description of commencement in order for the three possible commencements to be
deployed onto “la structure à trois temps de la répétition” which “n’est pas moins celle d’Hamlet
que d’Œdipus” (Deleuze, 1968, p. 123).  Here their beginning-ness is not fully destroyed, yet this
schema returns to force the circle open in various ways according to a still-logical re-configura-
tion.  This is tantamount to an emancipation and a forcing out of two special factors – labor and
land – which are always already forced into the “clôture” at some point in time and space while at
the same time being (supposed to be) forced out.
All in all, my present experiment attempts to re-grasp the Althusserian standpoint that “C’est-
à-dire qu’au lieu de penser la contingence comme modalité ou exception de la nécessité, il faut
penser la nécessité comme le devenir-nécessaire de la rencontre de contingents” (Althusser, 1994,
p. 566) from the aspect of the inauguration [fundus] and/or the forcing [forçage] (Badiou, 1988, §
36) of the commencement of the defective circle, which I would call capital (and therefore its
coerced counterpart, our living labor).  The defective is therefore none other than the “us”
who/which are and is (at once) continually forced to jam the human labor – his/her
“Möglichkeit/Fähigkeit” (Marx, 1976b, p. 189), in other words Dunamis8 – into and through the
“nigh-impossible/unreason [Muri] (literally in Japanese, the nil of reason無−理)” of the commod-
ification of our labour power (Uno, 1973, pp. 134-5).
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7 This neologism, which frequently appears in what follows, means “advent-qua-event.” 
8 For details of this issue, see Virno (2oo2, pp. 79ff.) and Virno (1999, pp. 121-23).
More specifically, in Capital, which is compelled by Lenin to take pride of standing in for the
Logik,9 the commencement(s) qua ad/e-vents that logically prepare the theory of value-form are
provisionally deployed in three domains: the commodity posited at the very outset of Capital,10 the
exchange (process),11 and the so-called12 originary accumulation.13 The latter two are eventually
and eventally incorporated as invisible facets and yet forced to be conserved (aufgehobene). Thus
the direct task here is to re-interpellate these three commencement(s) qua ad/e-vents in their own
right and elucidate their hierachical relationship disguised in the logical description of Capital.
As is well known, in Capital, these three commencements are given, in line with the above
three realms, their respective names. These are the commodity [Ware], which always already
ought to be capitalist, the exchange/deed [Tat], which can be observed as ubiquitous in history,
and the Gewalt, which is mystified and concealed as the original sin [Sündenfall] and then
appeased as the Kraft.
It goes without saying that they are, for those external observers who only seek to logicalize
Capital according to the Hegelian logic, the names given only ex post facto or in retrospect.  As
the present text seeks to illuminate, in the particular process that is re-membered (literally) /inter-
nalized [er-innern] as an auto-history of the capitalist commodity14 that continues to survive as the
one and only commencement, the latter two are – albeit by different methods and functions – to be
eventaly reduced or domesticated into the unique commencement (the capitalist commodity) after
being “under erasure [sous rature]” (Spivak, 1997, p. xiv) by being “forced into” the former as “a
previously established identity” for the sake of logical description (Deleuze, 1968, p. 73).  In the
case of the exchange (process), it is – as a methodological dispositif that configures the structure of
the narrative called the capitalist commodity as socially relevant/legal [gültig] – reduced into the
former as two isomorphically connected equivalent forms (the general form of value or money and
the Hobbesian state).  In the case of originary accumulation, whose name is disgraced as
Sündenfall, it is likewise forced out into the outside/invisible, behind which the structure of the
capitalist commodity as an eternal present [now-here qua no-where] is to be narrativized.
This is the outer constellation of the theoretical dispositif in my re-reading of Capital where
the commencement and the singular are deemed univocal.  Amplifying this point just a touch fur-
ther in order to paraphrase the path of the present project, what is under scrutiny here shall be the
meanings of the contrast that are simultaneously formed and erased in the logical interpretation of
Capital. On the one hand, there is a social “relevancy-legality/Gültigkeit” consigned to capital
based upon exploitation, which is buttressed, firstly, by the idyllic “peace” that is fabricated
thanks to complicity between the value-form and the exchange process, and, secondly, by violent
expropriation,15 which is presupposed to be destined to be “modernized” into a peaceful exploita-
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9 Lenin once said that “If Marx did not leave behind him a ‘Logic’ (with a capital letter), he did leave the logic of
Capital, and this ought to be utilised to the full in this question. In Capital, Marx applied to a single science logic, dialectics
and the theory of knowledge of materialism [three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing] which has taken
everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further” (Lenin, 1915, p. 315).
10 This is the generic name given to the “elementary form” of an “immense collection of commodities” (C1, p. 125).
11 The exchange process (der Austauschprozeß) in the original version (Marx, 1962, p. 99) is simply rewritten in the
Lachatre version “Des Échanges” (Marx, 1967, p. 34).
12 We are not allowed to forget that Marx adds a word “sogenannte (so-called),” which is strictly connected to
“ursprüngliche.”
13 Hereafter, I use “originary accumulation” in place of “primitive accumulation.”
14 Hereafter, I use the word “capitalist commodity” as the commodity which is produced under the capitalist system.
15 It goes without saying that the word “expropriation” is derived from the French “exproprier” whose etymon is the
Latin adjective “ex-proprius.”  “Proprius” means “own” or “belonging” so that “ex-proprius” literally means “ex-property”
which is rendered in German “Enteignung.”  Therefore, “expropriation” does not necessarily mean violent deprivation.
tion based on a “so-called” equal exchange among “owners.” On the other hand, there is another
complicit relation between the exchange process that is re-membered/internalized ex post facto by
embracing the former complicity and the originary accumulation that is pre-supposed to be erased
[sous rature] and subsumed. Also, there is an eternity that is based upon “peace,” which is staged
thanks to both the violent expropriation that has been legally pacified, and its formation as the law
of private property.
Behind this, there exists the problematic of the procedure of exposition – Darstellung16 –
which is to say, the logically formal system, whose ultimate task in Hegel is to return to the depart-
ing-point and complete circularity. This procedure would never allow plural commencements,
namely, plural ad/e-vents, no matter what kind of return or completion is presumed.  Those
observers who are fascinated by the elegance of logic as a system would therefore choose only the
sort of commencement that initiates, only based upon the pre-supposition [Voraus-setzung] of logi-
cal consistency, an itinerary of logic from a pre-determined commencement to a return to that com-
mencement while belatedly demonstrating the logical legitimacy of positing the commencement
post-hoc (or “picked up” to borrow Hegel’s expression).  In this regard, ad-hoc [Zufall] is to be
always already domesticated by post-hoc [Necessity] in capital and Capital, whose main task is,
bearing in mind the Deleueze to be cited at the end of this text (Deleuze, 2002), to logically realize
what capital dreams of with itself/autós.17
As a co(n)-sequence, in the logical system of Capital, the capitalist commodity that is fabri-
cated as the one and only commencement is both continually – in the case of exo-colonisation –
and cyclically – in the case of endo-colonisation such as industrial crises –  haunted by the other
two commencements18 which are actually always there – as archi-écriture (qua Ur-teil/partage) and
clandestine supplements – while it has to manufacture every time the possibility of the impossibili-
ty of erasing this haunting through formalization.  This is the very reason that Marx, punning on
the Aeneid, sarcastically appreciates capital’s historical and cyclical drudgery by saying: “Tantae
milis erat [So great was the effort required …]” (C1, p. 925).
In what follows, I shall first outline the issues around the first commencement (the capitalist
commodity) without avoiding certain repetitions, then articulate the rapport between the third com-
mencement (originary accumulation) and the first.  Upon viewing the rapport above, I will scruti-
nize the relationship between the second commencement (exchange process) and the first. Lastly, I
return to the ontic and therefore ontological problematic: «we, the defective commodity-beings».
2. The Commodity Complete(d)
As primary fact, the cause is qualified as having absolute indepen-
dence and a subsistence maintained in face of the effect: but in the
necessity, whose identity constitutes that primariness itself, it is whol-
ly passed into the effect. […] [I]t’s in the effect that the cause first
becomes actual and a cause. The cause consequently is in its full truth
causa sui (Hegel, 1892, pp. 276-7)
Here Hegel provides the expressive image that enables the capitalist commodity to look back
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16 For this point, Negri (1991, pp. 11ff.) is provocative.
17 This task is the very task of Political Economy in Marx’s sense.  Capital should be the Critique of Political
Economy.
18 This dichotomy (exo/endo-colonialisation) is derived from Virilio (for instance, Virilio, 1978).
over its allegedly historical and logical path towards its self-stylized clean and cleansed autós (i.e.
the capitalist commodity as the first commencement).  This image is nothing but a mirror that
reflects the second and third commencements, insofar as they are not only considered defective
from the standpoint of the first commencement which claims to be complete(d); but they are also
appropriated by it in a merely formal sense.  An inverted mirror image, it is perhaps the past that
the first commencement should prefer to disavow and exorcise.  The reason why the second and
third commencements are regarded as defective is the scandalous/obscene pore or t(a)in of the mir-
ror memory which the first commencement fears while arrogating causa sui to itself as
complete(d).   The commencement for the commodity to be able to auto-describe and re-member
from the standpoint of causa sui is given at the outset of the Chapter on Commodities, which is
supposed to be the inevitable ladder for the theory of value-form (Bensaïd 1995: 293ff).  This first
commencement is exactly the capitalist commodity.  It is posited by a well-known phrase in the
early part of Capital: “The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails
[herrescht] appears as an ‘immense collection of commodities [Warensammlung]’; the individual
commodity appears as its elementary from.  Our investigation [Untersuchung] therefore begins
with the analysis of the commodity” (C1, p. 125, my italics).  This first commencement (already) at
once subsumes and excludes the other two commencements as the identical (with itself) in the
name of the logical circle. It not only arrogates its legitimacy and justification to itself but also
secures capital’s perverted claim that it can fill the role of organizing modern (civil) society as the
one and sole “Subjekt-als-Substanz,” to borrow Hegel’s expression (Hegel, 1969c, chap. 3). 
Here I put aside various arguments concerning the character of the commodity posited at the
very beginning of Capital. What is more important is the question as to whether or not we can talk
about in this context labor power and land as distinct commodities from the commodity in general.
Still, there seems to be little objection towards considering the commodity posited at the beginning
of Capital as the capitalist commodity abstracted as a form of circulation. This would include its
logical relationship with Uno’s standpoint of the so-called osmosis of circulation into the produc-
tion from the outside,19 which is becoming a “visible” narrative in the context of the theory of
exchange.  If so, then we can understand that the commodity prepared for the development of the
theory of value-form in the Chapter on Commodities can be regarded as capitalist, and therefore,
as far as capital is concerned, it also can be the “logical” commodity in that it is clearly distin-
guished from the historically ubiquitous simple commodities in their “antediluvian forms” (C1, p.
266).  The historico-logical implications here deny the Diamat type of historical (materialism)
model. Here it is assumed that, prior to the establishment of the capitalist system, the theoretical
Merkmal of which assumes a perfectly complete(d) and closed cycle by virtue of the production of
commodities by means of commodities (to borrow the title of Sraffa’s seminal book), there is a
simple commodity society in which capital and labor encounter and merge in the course of a
“slow” (C1, p. 905),  time-consuming, peaceful and idyllic stratification.20
However, even the capitalist commodity qua commencement, too, can only be given a peace-
ful beginning in the paradoxical sense that it theoretically ought to internalize the originary accu-
mulation (violence) by excluding it from the logical system.  Marx regards “usurer’s capital
[Wucherkapital]” and “merchant’s capital [Kaufmannskapital]” (C1, esp. pp. 256-7)21 as “capital in
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19 Uno does not name his specific method “osmosis.”  This term was used as a criticism by his adversaries.
20 For the details, see Lefebvre et al. (1978), Aston and Philpin (1985), and Katz (1989).
21 We should be very careful not to conflate both “commercial capital [Handelskapital]” with “merchant’s capital”
and “usurer’s capital” with “interest-bearing capital [zinstragendes Kapital].” Of course, when thinking about so-called
“cognitive capitalism” and the role of rent(-seeking) in it, the possible conflation is actual.  We have to think about it from
the viewpoint of fictitious capital (see Nagahara, 2000).
general or capital on the whole [Kapital quand même]” (C1, p. 914).22 If so, then it can be said that
a commodity insofar as it can represent the “commodity in general or commodities on the whole
[Ware quand même]” – in comparison to the complete/perfect capitalist commodity – is “incom-
plete and defective” (Spivak, 2000, p. 7 et passim) and yet [quand même] is allowed to be called a
commodity, which, in a bundle, is dressed in a “very simple and contentless” pure form of circula-
tion (C1, p. 90). 
In this sense, the capitalist commodity qua the first commencement tacitly presupposes that it
can be an eternal totality as it invaginates its “before/past” as a defective commodity.  Therefore,
this first commencement merely envelops and subsumes from the outside (or from between-ness),
being indifferent to the content of production itself or to how commodities are actually produced.
This is what we call a function of osmosis, which only becomes possible on this basis of the capi-
talist indifference towards content.  What is always and already presupposed here is a “translation”
into “commodity-language [Warensprache]” (C1, p. 144), which is a completed form of the imma-
ture and savage defective commodity. An instance of this can be found, as we shall see later, in the
metonymic slippages in word-use in Goethe’s Faust through which something like the Lacanian
“point de capiton” is sought while at the same time presupposing its eventual destination (the
Other).  In this sense, this commencement is always in a state of constantly already cleansed conta-
mination (cf. Hamacher 2001).  Only as the dispositif which can internalize such “Fehler” through
the commencement that opens up the theory of value-form is the capitalist commodity allowed to
be the sole commencement for the system of Capital as a whole.  The destination of its return is, in
this sense, nothing but a form (commodity-qua-Eidos), be it the Classes defined in the last part of
Capital and The Trinity Formula associated with it and the commodification of capital itself as fic-
titious capital in this Formula.  Here the paradise of Bentham is finally finished (C1, p. 280).23
However, if so, in the capitalist commodity posited at the very beginning there also enfolds
the ad/e-vent (Ur-arché or Ur-teil/partage) of something that allows it to be the capitalist commod-
ity in various ways (as we have seen in the “peace” called the circulation form).  It is possible to
assume here a distant working, perhaps of the Urstaat, of another commencement that allows the
commencement for capital to deploy and re-member itself in a logical manner.  If this other com-
mencement can be posited logically with its singular status, it can also be considered to be quali-
fied to take the place of the capitalist commodity and become an un-improper or de-expropriated
commencement.  However, this might cause an infinite regressus and an “unendliche Progreß”
(Hegel, 1969b, p. 567), which is problematic for the logical description.  This infinite regressus
must be halted. It should thus be (pre-)disposed as a dangerous supplement (Derrida, 1967, chap 2)
for the logical completion as if it had no rapport or were non-existent.  This disposition is an orga-
nized, i.e. logical condensation of the ontic eruption of the defect or of Uno Kōzō’s “Muri/nil-of-
reason/unreason” (Uno, 1973, pp. 134-5) in(to) the perfect circle by way of the erasure/inclusion
of the “Fehler” that are yet be attenuated.  Insofar as the logical deployment of the commencement
proves in itself to be a logically legitimate positing of the commencement, there is, as its logical
co(n)-sequence, no other way for the commencement qua other commencement to be posited as
non-logical in light of the logical circle that takes off from the posited commencement. Thus, it is
required to be excluded from the commencement.  As the alterity/alien to the logic considered as
the commencement sustaining the capitalist commodity, namely, the autonomous circular move-
ment of capital, the possible commencement qua other commencement must be the ad/e-vent of
something that both haunts the logical completion and yet is sine qua non to the logic and, simulta-
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22 In the original version, Marx uses this wording “Kapital quand même,” to which a footnote is delivered that says
that the “quand même” means “überhaupt” (Marx, 1962, p. 778).
23 I would add, in passing, that Bentham’s panopticon is the cage of gaze through contentless form/Eidos.
neously, a certain non-logical ad/e-vent to the logic.  So this commencement is a system within
which is im-pli-cated an ad/e-vent of the radical coup of the non-logical, or the “historical.” This
coup as such guarantees its rupture with the logical system. 
In this respect, Spivak writes: “The rest is history,” parodying a well-known phrase from
Hamlet – “… with th’occurents more and less/ Which has solicited – the rest is silence.” She is
aware of this dispositif and she describes history as being forced to be silent as the residue of the
logic which is supposed to take over from history (Spivak, 2000, p. 21, my italics).  Perhaps, in
this regard, Marx succinctly gives the legal maxim “Le mort saisit le vif!” (C1, p. 91).24 The non-
logical is transferred to the capitalist commodity and appears cyclically also as a fearful memory
of something with its own inexorable logic but which, however, has to vanish as a mediator
(Jameson 1988: pp.83-4; 2002: pp.84, 226).  This is the point at issue of which Marx remarks in a
different context, “The movement through which this process has been mediated vanishes in its
own result, leaving no trace behind” (C1, p. 187). Traces, however, inevitably remain.
To describe the problem of the contamination of the commencement in the circle and to dis-
cuss who the ghosts [Geist], i.e. «we, the defective commodity-beings», are, there have been two
powerful shibboleths. One is Augustine who says that “non in tempore sed cum tempore incepit
creatio.” The other is Marx who distinguishes logic and history by maneuvering a Hegelian dialec-
tical circle based on the Voraus-setzung.  As we shall see, capital’s axiomatic auto-positing as
causa sui had to pre-fix the commencement that allows a return to the first coup of Genesis, in
order to imagine itself dialectically (Marx, 1967, p. 315).  In order for us to scrutinize this process
in more detail and discover or encounter «we, the defective commodity-beings» not in the future
but now, we have to begin not with the second commencement, our storyteller, but with Marx, who
takes the violence back to the third commencement. 
3. Original Sin Theologized
L’invisible est défini par le visible comme son invisible, son interdit
de voir: l’invisible n’est donc pas simplement, pour reprendre la méta-
phore spatiale, le dehors du visible, les ténèbres extérieures de l’exclu-
sion, intérieure au visible même, puisque definie par la structure du
visible (Althusser, 1996, pp. 20-21, my italics).
Here Althusser soberly notes the visibility rightfully haunted by the ghost [Geist] of the invis-
ible.  The same Althusser, who contributes a preface to the reprinted (Flammarion) version of the
Lachatre version of Capital, enlists, as the two great discoveries of the book, the “plus-value” and
“l’accumulation primitive,” and defines the crux of the latter as “le pire violence” (Althusser,
1969, p. 17).  The Althusser of the above epigraph, dealing with the crux of a symptomatic read-
ing, offers us the most crucial viewpoint with which to deal with originary accumulation as the
third commencement.  What he offers here is the perspective that originary accumulation as the
third commencement is the darkness of exclusion internalized within (and haunting) the visible,
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24 Please note that Marx gives a “legal” maxim. This conundrum can be dissolved only by some sort of imperative
given from outside. In relation to this, Marx sometimes used an expression “quido pro quo”. It is nothing but the tragically
annoying conundrum that the tit for tat [quido pro quo]  of what has already happened as staged in Hamlet (and Œdipus
Tyrannus) – the story of the repetition of the past ad/e-vent where, while it is the past [ghost] that haunts the living, it is the
same past [ghost] that also solicits the silence (cover-up) – or the mourning that is the subjugation/appeasement of the tur-
moil for the sake of the bereft is guaranteed only by the imperative of the past [ghost] to continue to (be) memorize(d).
because it is defined as ex post facto (though it is factually ex ante facto) by the first commence-
ment that seeks to lift its head independently as the visible.  Now how does Marx describe this? 
As is well-known, from the vantage point of the “starting-point” given retrospectively to the
general law of capitalist accumulation, Marx defines originary accumulation as “the process […]
which creates the capital-relation” and “which divorces the worker from the ownership [Eigentum]
of the conditions of his own labour.”  The process of the commodification of labour power is
based on a process where “great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of
subsistence and hurled onto the labour-market as free, unprotected and rightless proletarians.”
Marx discovers behind this process the “expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant,
from the soil” and its commodification.  Having pre-supposed the third commencement, Marx sets
up a “vicious circle” where “the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value
presupposes capitalist production; capitalist production presupposes the availability of consider-
able masses of capital and labour-power in the hands of commodity producers” (C1, pp. 873-6, my
italics).  About this vicious circle, he left the following famous account: 
The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn around in a vicious circle [fehlerhaften
Kreislauf/defective circle], which we can only get out of by assuming a primitive accu-
mulation (the ‘previous accumulation’ of Adam Smith) which precedes capitalist accu-
mulation: an accumulation which is not the result of the capitalist mode of production
but its point of departure [Ausgangspunkt] (C1, p. 873, my italics).
What is implied here is not a vicious circle in the common sense that a solution to one trouble
invites another, but rather that there is already and inexorably something “fehlerhaft” in the com-
mencement only by which capital initiates the circle in its accumulation.  Capital, however, can
never allow that a defective circulation exists in its self-describing autós as causa sui because the
acknowledgment of this defect is a negation of the autós by the autós of the commencement or
return.  For capital, therefore, this should be described as a circulation mistakenly haunted or false-
ly assumed [fehler-haften], namely, as an intentionally mis-recognized circulation.  For it to be
real, this defect ought not to be a defect.  Instead, it must be a “Schranke” which is anticipated so
that it can be overcome. Therefore the “Grenze” is regarded as “Zufall” (Marx, 1976b, p. 249).
But what is to be done for capital?  In order for capital to inaugurate its own geometrically smooth
circular movement,25 capital has to both recollect/internalize in itself [sich erinnern] originary
accumulation as a historical rupture outside, and forget it in the logic to be complete(d). In this
way is the ghost exorcised.  In this manner, the recollection/internalization [Erinnerung] is always
accompanied by dissent/warning [Erinnerung].  Here is the reason why an analogy is made here
with a theology.  However, this theology cannot simply erase the defect. What it can do is to
defer26 the defect by giving it a form appropriate to the first commencement, which is none other
than a reduction of the defect into the commencement called the “simple and slight in content
[inhaltlos und einfach]” commodity (C1, p. 90) by rendering and theologizing the unreason of the
violent process of the double commodification of labor and land as original sin.  Vis-à-vis the
original sin/theology, Marx says as follows in relation to Political Economy: the capital(ist) sci-
ence (Hardt and Negri, 1994, chap. 3). 
This originary accumulation plays approximately the same role in political economy as origi-
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26 This Derridian wording (différance) also signifies two lexical meanings: procrastination and “to delegate to anoth-
er/admittance.”
nal sin does in theology. […] Its origin [Ursprüng] is supposed to be explained when it is told
as an anecdote about the past (C1, p. 873, my italics).
For capital, it ought to be “the past” – what is always already passed and finished – or “an
anecdote” in senso stricto, i.e. “an-ék-dota.”  For political economy, it is a mouthpiece of capital’s
desire to describe itself as causa sui, about which Žižek not only points out correctly that originary
accumulation is a narrativization of the birth(place) of its autós, but also stresses that the auto-nar-
rativization (recollection/internalization) of capital itself can be(come) a narrative
(recollection/internalization) only in complicity with the form-ism (morphology) given by the first
commencement. 
[B]oth Marx and Freud were the two great formalizers.  In his analysis of commodity
fetishism, Marx asserts that the mystery of the commodity-form resides in this form itself, not
in the content hidden beneath it, thereby echoing Freud’s remark (in his masterpiece with the
misleading title The Interpretation of Dreams) that the specificity of the dream resides in its
form as such, not in the content encoded in this form. For this precise reason, Marx’s deploy-
ment of the commodity-form in Chapter 1 of Capital is not a “narrative,” a Vorstellung, but a
Darstellung, the deployment of the inner structure of the universe of merchandise – the narra-
tive, on the contrary, is the story of “primitive accumulation,” the myth capitalism proposes
about its own origins. (Žižek, 2002, pp. 190-91)
So it is that Marx says: “To understand the course taken by this change, we do not need to go
back very far at all” (C1, p. 875). He adds in the Lachatre version that: “L’histoire de leur expro-
priation n’est pas matière à conjecture” (Marx, 1967, p. 315). In the part that speaks of the trans-
formation of surplus-value into capital where the commodification of labor-power must be an
implicit yet inevitable logical presupposition, he states: “[O]riginal sin is at work everywhere.
With the development of the capitalist mode of production, with the growth of accumulation and
wealth, the capitalist ceases to be merely the incarnation of capital.  He begins to feel a human
warmth towards his own Adam” (C1, p. 740).   These phrases suggest that a theological-type nar-
rative both haunts and contaminates the formal purity/circularity not in the past but in the present
and continues to create hybrids.  Spivak correctly points out in relation to this device regarding
theology: “Theory takes as its object things that are birthless and cannot be verbally articulated.
Marx is looking at the circuits of capital, the birth of whose originary accumulation cannot be
philosophically grasped, only narrativized.” Spivak does not simply insists upon a return from
form (Eidos) in order to restitute content (Hyle); she stresses that for the subsumption of originary
accumulation into the first commencement as form, the theologization of the originary accumula-
tion is essential,so much so that she seeks to confront the narrative of capital with the necessity of
“the story of storying – of the rewriting of the logical model of social justice into a narrative of
population movements” (Spivak, 2000, p. 5, pp. 24-5, my italics).  We can read the great word
“birthless” (i.e. of mean extraction!) here, which is exactly what I would term “defective.”
Despite the logicist reading of Capital which criticizes the mix of historical descriptions into
the Capital revised as Logik, Marx himself seeks to give a “restance” (Derrida, 1988, p. 52; cf.
Gaston, 2006, pp. 96-7) to the “very simple and contentless” commencement in itself.  This is a
project of repetitiously counter-positing the so-called history as founded as the real history against
“the legend of theological original sin” as it had already been transferred to the economic narra-
tive.
My question is therefore this. By this “real” does Marx try to oppose historical facts as cele-
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brated in the chronological table against theology?  This interpretation might be easy to accept, so
much so that so-called historical facts come to be rejected by the logicist interpretation as impuri-
ties that must be logically purified.  It is nonetheless wrong to consider it as a counter-positing of
historical fact against theoretical purity.  Marx’s introjections of historical facts into the logical
system do not simply amount to his emphasis on the concrete violence vis-à-vis the separation
between direct producers and the means of production.  What is crucial here is the fact that the vio-
lence [Gewalt] which reappears in the theory of exchange process metamorphosed as “power-leg-
islative effects [Kraft]” is implicitly posited here as an auxiliary line.  In other words, Marx inves-
tigates the role of the violence of “the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of
society to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production
into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition,” namely the process of forçage (Badiou,
1988; Hallward, 2003, pp. 135ff.) which is though still “economic power [ökonomische Potenz]”
(C1, pp. 915-6, my italics). Thus he already questions in its formalization the significance of the
direct violence that the third commencement historically exercised. This is the matter of a new
form of violence which is necessary in order to take in its content as “property,” and erase the vio-
lence in the third commencement which is, nevertheless, necessary for the first commencement. 
Marx points out that capital, which desires by its nature to absolutely deterritorialize itself
even more freely than “vogelfrei” laborers27, clings on to originary accumulation as the third com-
mencement that is violently swallowed and annexed by the first commencement in the process of
theologization.  This incorporation of the third commencement into the first through the formal
pacification of the violence enables a reduction of the (Kaufmann/merchant) deed/Tat as the sec-
ond commencement into the first. This not only affirms “the social adequacy/legality
[gesellschaftlich Gültigkeit]” (C1, p. 180) of the capitalist commodity as the first commencement
but also inexorably invites into itself the state that is nevertheless the very obstacle to capital in
light of the originary desire of capital to be an axiomatic system.  This is, however, clearly a dou-
ble bind for capital, which however can be dissolved only by subtending its “Schranke” incessant-
ly yet “under particular circumstances.”  This limitless subtending becomes the second nature of
capital.
Marx, in the original version of Capital, writes as follows concerning originary accumulation.
“In themselves, money and commodities are no more capital than the means of production and
subsistence.  They need to be transformed into capital.  But this transformation can itself only take
place under particular circumstances.” He goes on to say:
[T]he confrontation of, and the contact between two very different kinds of commodity
possessors [Warenbesitzern] must take place; on the one hand, the owners [Eigner, i.e.
legally qualified Persons] of money, means of production, means of subsistence, who are
eager to valorize the sum of values they have appropriated by buying the labour-power
of the others; on the other hand, free workers, the seller of the labour-power, and there-
fore the sellers of labour (C1, p. 874, my italics).
In this passage it appears that the previous pedagogic definition of originary accumulation –
that is, the separation of direct producers from the means of production – seems to have been re-
paraphrased in a somewhat neutral manner. In fact, it is tacitly describing a couple of crucial
points. The first point is the issue of uncertainty due to the “particular circumstances” that are
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literally means “Homo Sacer” who is deprived of legal protection (Agamben, 1998).
supposed to stage the encounter between capital and labor.28 The second point is also indispensable
to the relationship with the commencement in the theory of the exchange process. This is the prob-
lematic of property rights qua that of originary accumulation, where we can see a careful wording
of “commodity possessor/occupier [Waren-besitzern]” instead of commodity “owner [Eigner]”
since the establishment of property rights has not yet been introduced.  This is because, as Deleuze
and Guattari correctly point out, the encounter between these two fundamental productive ele-
ments can only be a historical contingency which is only necessitated theoretico-retrospectively.
The necessity called contingency [Zufall-als-Schicksal!] is guaranteed only by the violence of the
institutional or forced encounter between the laborer whose only right is to dispose of his/her own
[proprius] body and the capitalist who occupies the place where property rights are always already
acknowledged – violently appropriated or not – over the means of production.  For this
encounter/contingency called clinamen to be forced into necessity, “the force of circumstances
[Zwang der Umstände],” namely “the extra-economic force [außerökonomische Zwang],” has to
be metamorphosed into the “peaceful” force in the market called “the silent compulsion [stumme
Zwang]” through the reiterated process of social “deeds” (C1, p. 896, p. 899).29 The premise of
this logical stage (in the original version) where Marx seems to describe simply the “Fehler” of
“defective circulation” in terms of their functions as laborer and capitalist is, however, totally
changed in the Lachatre version.  Therein a “Person,” in the Hegelian sense, which is posited
instrumentally in the original version, is further specified as the subject of the property (right)/con-
tract [Vertrag] relation, the subject that can tolerate [vertragen] the existence of the seemingly
equal other (and his/her property right) via public and commercial trans-act(ion)s.  This problem
cannot be explained away by the claim that in the descriptive procedures of Capital the account of
originary accumulation should be located after and outside that of exchange.  This point cannot be
ignored for this experiment, which tries to divide the arché into three commencements in mutual
contamination.  Marx in the Lachatre version writes as follows:
La rapport officiel entre le capitaliste et le salarié est d’un caractère purement mercanti-
le.  Si le premier joue le rôle de maître et le dernier le rôle de serviteur, c’est grâce à un
contrat par lequel celui-ci s’est non-seulement mis au service, et partant sous la dépen-
dance, de celui-là, mais par lequel il a renoncé à tout titre de propriété sur son propre
produit (Marx 1967, p. 315, my italics). 
This is not just evidence to justify the “Transition of the Laws of Property that Characterise
Production of Commodities into Laws of Capitalist Appropriation” or the so-called “Kehr” of
“Aneignung” (C1, chap. 24, § 1).  It is rather an aesthetic aspect of capital’s auto-description
which, by theologizing the “Fehler” in the defective circulation, shunts the “Fehler” far away into
the past (i.e. that which is hopefully fully finished). With this expulsion/purification, it shelters the
capitalist commodity as the first commencement from contaminating “Fehler” of the existence of
the other two commencements.  This is carried out by way of swallowing the “Fehler” into its own
principio (commencement-qua-principle) as an axiom, which does not need, unlike a theorem, to
be proven or demonstrated but is instead considered to be either self-evident or subject to a neces-
sary decision [Ur-teil/originary division]). This contractual fulcrum is at once a formalization (ren-
dering it non-violent) of property and a peaceful “Ver-kehr (communication).”  At the same time,
it is literally nothing short of a vicious circle that is supplemented only and barely by a description
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28 We shall see at the end of this text that this is the point on which Deleuze and Guattari criticize Marx(ians).
29 Please note here that Marx has already used the term “Zwang” instead of “Gewalt” to describe this process.
of the establishment of such concepts as property rights and contracts (namely free trade) based in
law upon state violence.   This is called Civil Society where laborers are entitled to be Benthamite
civilians together with capitalists, both of which are formally equal in terms of the commodity-
owner (Eigentumer).
The more emphatically Marx, as if obsessed by the logic of capital which capital dreams in
and with itself, seeks to narrativize the theology of original sin in order to secure the capitalist
commodity qua the first commencement as the conception immaculée from the third, the more seri-
ously he should face up to the fact that the state (qua original and external violence) is here
exposed, even though it is translated into economic potency, made peaceful, and inscribed in the
system.  What is more problematic is that he signifies that the first commencement can annex the
third only by way of the formalization of violence through economic potency.  This disavowal of
the supplement is truly a vicious circle.
For instance, vis-à-vis the issue of colonialism which seems to be foreign to the logical
description of capital, especially after the many criticisms of Rosa Luxemburg, Marx mocks the
political economist who “applies the notions of law and of property inherited from a pre-capitalist
world, with all the more anxious zeal and all the greater unction, the more loudly the facts cry out
in the face of his ideology.” This applies not only to colonies as visible exteriorities for the “ready-
made [completed] world of capital” [diese fertige Welt des Kapitals] (C1, p. 931), but also to the
ad/e-vents that have always already happened and become invisible to “la société capitaliste déjà
faite” (Marx, 1967, p. 343).30
In this precise manner,  the ad/e-vent’s ex ante facto and ex post facto are transferred [über-
tragen] to the ad/e-event’s exteriority and interiority respectively, then translated/over-posited
[übersetzen] into exclusivities that are then exhibited or displayed (cf., de Man, 1979, pp. 119-26).
Here, the economic potency that exists at its core comes to function not simply upon various
examples of mercantile policies, but also, most importantly, at the ad/e-vent of the concept of
property rights and contracts. Here we might recall the bourgeois revolution qua political event as
an expression of the most intense economic potency.  
Balibar says that “L’analyse de l’accumulation primitive nous met ainsi en présence de l’
absence de mémoire radicale qui caractérise l’histoire,” and adds “la mémoire n’étant que la
réflexion de l’histoire en certains lieux prédétemines – l’idéologie, voire le droit – et comme telle,
rien moins que fidèle” (Balibar, 1996, p. 534, original italics). When we pay more attention to “qui
caractérisé l’histoire” than to Balibar’s own italics, we can see that this “absence of memory” or
“forgetting” is an obsessive compulsion that originates from originary accumulation being theolo-
gized and logicalized/formalized as a memory of the capitalist commodity that arrogates the
unique commencement to itself. Therefore, in “certains lieux prédétemines,” what is glimpsed here
is the first commencement. Furthermore, when it is specified as “ideology, even law,” what is
indicated are property rights, backed by the bourgeois state, which clandestinely undertake the first
commencement qua capitalist commodity.  In the first commencement, everything is deemed
always already complete(d).  Even more progressively, Althusser also says that “Dans cette accu-
mulation originelle les idéologues du capitalisme racontaient l’histoire édifiante du capital, comme
les philosophes du droit naturel racontent l’histoire de l’État.” He even calls it “l’accumulation
primitive politique” (Althusser, 1977, p. 320, p. 321; cf. Montag, 1996, p. 97) .  Negri develops his
Foucaultian perspective by connecting the issue of originary accumulation with his own notion of
“constituent power.” It is the “[v]iolence” of the state that “constitutes the vehicle between accu-
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mulation and right.  It has no problem presenting in legal terms, or better, making law a subsidiary
element of accumulation.”  The state thus understood can accept laws-qua-its-formalization as “a
machine, […], a permanent procedure of the system,” which functions as “its constant innovation
and its rigid discipline” (Negri, 1999, p. 254, p. 257).  Here Negri insists on a smooth specific
segue from expropriation to exploitation or from violence to “peace” (recall footnote 13), behind
which, however, the violent “Geburtshelfer [midwife]” works hard (Marx, 1962, p.779) .
This point should not be dealt with only from a standpoint which, starting from the pre-fixed
division between those who are “condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow” and its
opposite (C1, p. 873), develops into the Foucaultian theory of discipline (Read 2002), or from the
attempt to reconsider the theory of labor-“Kultivierung/cultivation” in the theory of the Sozial
Politik Schule.  The fact is that the capitalist commodity being the first commencement, is backed
by the social establishment of the concept of property rights and contracts that are scooped up on
the “surface” of circulation from the “depth” of production through the exclusion of the third com-
mencement.  Deleuze and Guattari say:
D’où le caractère très particulier de la violence d’État: il est difficile d’assigner cette violence,
puisqu’elle se présente toujours comme déjà faite. Il ne suffit même pas de dire que la violen-
ce renvoie au mode de production. Marx le remarquait pour le capitalisme: il y a une violence
qui passe nécessairement par l’État, qui précède le mode de production capitaliste, qui
constitue l’«accumulation originelle», et rend possible ce mode de production lui-même. […]
C’est une violence qui se pose comme déjà faite, bien qu’elle se refasse tous les jours. C’est
le cas ou jamais de dire que la mutilation est préalable, préétablie (Deleuze et Guattari, 1980,
pp. 558-9).
Thus the “previous”ly established – if I rely on Smithian parlance – apparatus is, no matter
how obsessively political economy seeks to conceal it by calling it pastoral (Perelman, 2000), the
state qua violence, and the form the state takes, that is to say, its pacified core being the property
right and contract.  This “ur-mutilation,” as it were, is the ghostly [geistig] and dangerous supple-
ment which the first commencement, a crystallization of the theology of capitalism, has to ostra-
cize by any means.  Thus, although it is unacceptable for capital, which desires itself to be “the”
subtending limitlessness of an axiomatic system, the capitalist commodity as commencement is
bound inside a specific “dementia” but, nevertheless, “works” extremely well. “C’est dément et ça
marche très bien” (Deleuze, 2002, p. 366, my italics),  so much so, in fact, that capital cannot
prove to be causa sui without relying on the state.  In order to describe this “full-nelson,” Deleuze
and Guattari frequently employ phrasing such as “se rabattre sur …” (Deleuze et Guattari, 1972:
16 et passim).  In this sense, the third commencement called originary accumulation qua the dan-
gerous supplement that always already haunts the capitalist commodity and contaminates it is
“préalable, préétablie.”
The dispositif by which this theology is switched into modern deism is the trading deed [Tat]
considered the “commencement [Anfang]” qua the capture [Fang] of society through exchange
(Deleuze et Guattari, 1980, pp. 592ff.). This switch allows the first commencement to appear as the
sole “Subjekt-als-Substanz” in organizing society by giving it a social adequacy/legality
[Gültigkeit], and this process is precisely the ad/e-vent of the state and of property rights.  What is
sought here is a description of the exchange process as the apparatus that sustains the
“Warenwelt/world of commodities” (C1, p. 129) as a society through the unique position of the
first commencement. This is a process of “alienation/Veräußerung” of the Hobbesian state as the
equivalent form by way of social exchange (i.e. social formation) by the possessors of commodi-
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ties. The process through which the theory of the exchange process mimicks the development of
the theory of value-form arrives at the question of money (the equivalent form), and is depicted as
a process that is co-substantive with the development of the exchange process.  It is also depicted
as a process through which to endow property rights with the commodity in the exchange process.
Originary accumulation is nothing if not an apparatus where the establishment of property rights is
implied behind the arrow in the proportional expression – exchange: society à money: state (equiv-
alent form as the third term). 
Originary accumulation is, as Marx points out correctly, a historical separation between pro-
ducers and the means of production (or the one and double ad/e-vent of the commodification of
land and labor power), but it is excluded from the logical system in order for capital to describe
what is allegedly its own history (past) as always already complete(d) and purified after re-discov-
ering its ex ante facto event as a procedural ex post facto, which then allowed it to function as a
given for the first commencement to operate.  It is also a retrospective perpetualization of the prop-
erty rights and of the “theological original sin” qua the commencement that has to be made part of
the narrative as an exquisite horror for capital.  
Though it lacks a viewpoint by which to grasp the commodification of property rights per se
elaborated as the theory of fictitious capital (see Nagahara, 2000), this process is made possible
only by endowing property rights with land and labor (body), both of which are special goods in
the sense that they cannot be reproduced as commodities by means of commodities., to which
Marx gives the name “material substratum/résidu matériel” (C1, p. 133; Marx, 1967, p. 16).31 Such
a commencement as the other, after being erased by both formality/logicality and the distant
place/eternity, is connected back to the exchange process as the second commencement, which
Deleuze and Guattari might call the encounter of “alliance and filiation” (Deleuze et Guattari,
1972: 227ff.).  The transition from the omnipresence of war to the process of the idyllically peace-
ful relations of economic exchange (or historically specific communication [Verkehr]) then
becomes possible (Dumont 1983: chaps. 1 et 2).  This is also the process through which labor and
land as the “material substratum” that provides a breach which possibly generates the “restance” in
the circle is degraded into merely being a residue [résidu] for the first commencement, under the
formalization or the axiomatization of violence called commodification.
4. Exchange
In the beginning was the Word/In principio erat Verbum/Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν
ὁ λόγος (Logos) /Im Anfang war die Wort (Evangelium Secundum
Johannemm 1:1)
These have one mind, and they give their power [virtutem] and author-
ity [potestatem] to the beast (The Apocalypse of John 17:13).
[N]o one would be able to buy or to sell, unless he has that mark, the
name of the beast or the number of his name (The Apocalypse of John
13:17)
As with originary accumulation, the dispositif that supplements the first commencement as a
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vanishing mediator is also assigned to the exchange process.  The exchange process is presented
with contradictory descriptions that are deemed confused even when seen from the aspect of logi-
cal purity.  This part is divided into two. The first (a little more than three pages in the original ver-
sion) is where the auto-development of the value-form is mimicked by the introduction of the
desiring subject – more correctly, “Bedürfnis/besoin” – and its reiterated deeds [Tat] that must be
summoned in order to dissolve the contradictions here. The second part (a little more than four
pages in the original version) is where commodity fetishism is narrativized as the “interstices
[Intermundien]” and the “pores [Poren]” (C1, p. 172) as seen from the viewpoint of the Genesis of
capital, on the one hand, and as the externality observed back from the vantage point of the com-
plete(d) form, on the other.  Both are, however, narrativized as if they were historico-social
processes.  The deed and interstices or externality also systemically constitute the exchange
process as the second commencement, namely, the very process through which the commodity,
forming the “gesellschaftlich Gültigkeit,” is affirmed as the capitalist commodity.  Marx here, who
attempts both logically and procedurally to finish the theory of value-form with the judgment that,
“That money as a commodity is […] only a discovery for those who proceed from its finished
shape in order to analyze it afterwards” (C1, p. 184, my italics), reiterates the theory of the
exchange process retrospectively as both the logicalized historical, and therefore ahistorical,
process in the theory of value-form and as a logicalized social process that corresponds to the for-
mer. 
There is, however, the famous phrase in the second half, which I quote below in relation to
the first half: “The direct exchange of products has the form of the simple expression of value in
one respect, but not as yet in another.  That form was x commodity A = y commodity B.  The form
of the direct exchange of products is x use-value A = y use-value B.  The articles A and B in this
case are not as yet commodities, but become [werden] so only through the deed of exchange” (C1,
p. 181).  We cannot ignore this Marx as one who tries to deduce the genesis of the state from the
transactive circulation/alienation process which is isomorphic to that where the exchange process
“sets apart (alienates [veräußern/übertragen])” (C1, p. 181) money as an equivalent form.
Therefore, we have to acknowledge the following point. Only because the capitalist commodity is
deemed able to represent the defective commodity under a subsumptive concept such as the “pure
exchange form,” the dispositif that guarantees a becoming of wealth (or the thing [Ding], accord-
ing to Marx) into commodities is considered to be – not the commodity but – exchange. 
Thus, the first commencement is allowed to be the commencement not only by tolerating the
“dangerous supplement” that is an exchange (social reciprocity) prior to “being commodity” but
also by politically accepting the establishment of the equivalent form qua the state, which is iso-
morphic with money for society and which legitimates property rights.  Here, Marx also says:
“They become exchangeable through the mutual desire of their possessors [Willensakt ihrer
Besitzer] to alienate them” (C1, p. 182). He goes on to say that since the “relationship of reciprocal
isolation and foreignness [Verhältnis wechselseitiger Fremdheit] does not exist for the members of
a primitive community of natural origin, […] [t]he exchange of commodities begins where com-
munities have their boundaries, at their points of contact with other communities, or with members
of the latter.  However, as soon as products have become commodities in the external relations of a
commodity, they also, by reaction, become commodities in the internal life of the community”
(C1, p. 182).32 This is nothing but a rephrasing of Marx’s point concerning the constitution of the
bourgeois (nation-)state – that property as an idea comes from the outside and is then internalized
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Deleuze and Guattari describe “L’espace troué” (Deleuze et Guattari, 1980, § 12-14).
along with the first commencement, which is originally foreign to the “primitive community of nat-
ural origin.”
The viewpoint which we call the process of “osmosis of circulation into production” and the
theory of the (formal/substantive) subsumption of the content/production/depth [Tiefe] by
form/circulation/surface [Oberfläche] continues to be attractive for the interpretation of the genesis
of capital (see Nagahara, 2000 and Backhaus, 1978). However, not only does the (capitalist) com-
modity have to tolerate another beginning-ness – exchange precedes the commodity – as the first
commencement, it is also bound by a specific reflexivity in which it has to persuade exchange once
allowed to come prior to it and persuade itself of this priority, because the capitalist commodity
has to maintain for itself the “gesellschaftlich Gültigkeit.” 
What kind of theoretical dispositif does Marx dispatch to the conundrum here?  His explana-
tion begins with the famous “watchman, guardian, custodian, and superintendent of the commodi-
ty.”  In the first half, Marx, as a genuine Hegelian, depicts the theory of the exchange process as a
system of Bedürfnis/besoin (that is to say, a civil society) and therefore of property. In this way, he
sets up a content, abstracted in the sense of a historical model of the theory of value-form, which,
seemingly historically, emerges through the simple, isolated, and accidental form of value.  He
begins with the following phrase: 
Commodities cannot themselves go to market and perform exchanges in their own right.
We must, therefore, have recourse to their guardians [Hütern], who are the possessors of
commodities [Warenbesitzern].  Commodities are things [Dinge], and therefore lack the
power to resist man [widerstandslos gegen den Menchen].  If they are unwilling [man-
quer de bonne volonté], he can use force [Gewalt].  In other words, he can capture/grab
them [sie nehmen/s’emparer] (C1, p. 178; Marx, 1967, p. 34, my italics )
Marx exploits somewhat aggressive words like “sie nehmen,” I am tempted to refer to the
commodified land and labor as well, albeit I am fully aware that such talk is an anomaly for those
who would seek a logical purification of Capital, but here we are experimenting with a mutual
contamination of three commencements as an ontic (and therefore ontological) theory of the event
qua value-theory in Capital. They offer an indispensable problematic concerning the process of
inscribing property rights into the full body and Socius (Deleuze et Guattari, 197o, chap. 3).
Though I acknowledge the criticism of dislodging the theory of the exchange process from the the-
ory of the value-form, I would repeat the theory of the value-form by transferring it to the
exchange process from the vantage point of these commencements.  Here in Marx, turning vio-
lence – “ökonomische Potenz” – into property rights by way of formalization in order to reduce it
to the first commencement is alluded to as an axiomatization of violence (pacifying violence with-
out any legitimacy) by capital.  This is also a process through which Bedürfnis/besoin is trans-
formed into desire while being captured by a relative lack (rareté) and thereby legally institutional-
ized and thus legitimized. If the process does not function, the capitalist commodity as the com-
mencement that represents the so-called defective commodities prior to it is not allowed to circu-
late autonomously/independently.  There is then no reason not to include the so-called special
commodities like labor power and land.  In fact, Marx could not have guaranteed the autonomous
circulation of capital without organically subsuming-while-excluding the special things [Ding]
called labor power and land that never become or always refuse to be complete(d) capitalist com-
modities, outside and inside capital in the forms of surplus populations, crises, and fictitious capi-
tal. 
As far as Marx’s historico-logical standpoint and his descriptive procedures are concerned,
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the “watchman, guardian, custodian, or superintendent” of the commodity must be distinct from
“Eigentümer” or even “Privateigentümer” to make “these objects” “enter into relation with each
other as commodities.” They “must [also] place themselves in relation to one another as persons
whose will resides in those objects.” This is a social recognition among “private owners.”  Here,
“persons exist for one another merely as representatives [Repräsentanten] and hence possessors, of
commodities” and “the characters who appear on the economic stage [Charaktermasken] are mere-
ly personifications of economic relations […].”  People confront one another as “bearers [Träger]”
(sometimes translated symbolically as “depositories”) of economic relations.  Thus Marx intro-
duces here merely the functional or logically imaginary aspect of the establishment of property
rights into the exchange process (C1, pp. 178-9).
However, in order for Marx to enable such a theoretical rendering, the first commencement
must have been already (and perhaps always) presupposed in the exchange here, and behind the
first commencement the third commencement must have been, again, already (and perhaps always)
built in – or “se rabattre” – and such a logical operation must have been ongoing.  For the “Person”
with “Charaktermasken” or “bonne volonté,” it must be that the capitalist commodity desires in
order to have its one and only social legitimacy affirmed.  Only because Marx thought that it had
already been built in or ongoing, is he able to approach the operation of “economic potency” via
the concept of contracts and speak of it, not as the violence [Gewalt] of “capture,” but as an estab-
lishment of the economic relation of “volition” prior to the enactment of property laws.  This
“volition” is, therefore, an alias of “Zwang.”
This juridical relation [Rechtsverhältnis], whose form is the contract [Vertrag], whether
as part of a developed legal system or not, is a relation between two wills which mirrors
the economic relation (C1, p. 178).
Concerning the formalization of violence (expropriation) into exploitation, legal power
[Kraft] intervenes in order for there to be the establishment of a mutual tolerance [Vertragung] via
the contract.  This phrase calls to mind, on the one hand, an ex post facto acknowledgement of the
establishment of the state’s enactment of laws through the cumulative process of the English com-
mon law – recall the rupture in England between the Tudor Enclosures and the Parliamentary
Enclosure (Renner, 1949)  – and, on the other, an indifference on which the pure form of circula-
tion relies.  This passage also implies the establishment of the former disguised as a spontaneous
and indigenous genesis of property rights and the emerging process of the latter which equally dis-
guises itself in the form of a spontaneity of the emergence of the modern state due to a between-
ness and an exteriority which illustrates the Hegelian distinction between the “innere Staat” and
the “aüßere Staat” in line with commodity exchange and the accumulation of capital (cf. Avineri,
1972). It is nothing but an alternate expression for the economic potency in originary accumula-
tion.  It is the very process of the formalization (commodification) of state violence that sustains
and promulgates the “gesellschaftlich Gültigkeit” of the capitalist commodity as a commencement
by way of a socially lawful reciprocity based upon property and legal contracts. 
Marx once said that “[C]ommodities must be realized as values before they can be realized as
use-values.  On the other hand, they must stand the test as use-values before they can be realized as
values [Die Waren müssen sich daher als Werte realisieren, bevor sie sich als Werte realisieren
können. Andrerseits müssen sie sich als Gebrauchswerte bewähren, bevor sie sich als Werte real-
isieren können]” (C1, p. 179; Marx, 1962, p. 100, my italics).  Here the overcoming of a contradic-
tion is spoken of as if waiting for the social approval of the “gesellschaftlich Gültigkeit” of money.
This quasi-contradiction might be a reiteration of the “becom[ing commodity] only through the
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deed of exchange” in terms of the theory of value.  And here, I almost misread the German word
«bewähren», which lexically means an actual proof of truth, as another German word «bewahren»
that signifies “to watch” or “to guard,” and yet this misreading should be etymologically sound.
Behind the “actual proof” of “truth” what is implied is the ad/e-vent of the “Nachtwächterstaat
(night watchman state)” as an equivalent value form which is distilled/alienated collectively, like
money as the third term, as the one and only Gewalt-als-Kraft whose only task is precisely to
guard private property invisibly, this being made possible via “gültig” social exchange.  Hence the
second commencement is spoken of as follows:
In their difficulties our commodity-possessors [Warenbesitzer/échangistes] think like
Faust: “In the beginning was the deed/Im Anfang war die Tat.”  They have therefore
already acted [handeln/agir/act (and therefore, trans-act)] before thinking.  The law of
the nature of the commodity has performatively acted in the natural instinct of the pos-
sessors of commodities [Die Gesetze der Warennatur betätigten sich im Naturinstinkt
der Warenbesitzer] (C1, p. 180, translation modified; Marx, 1967, p. 35)
The “commodity-possessors” in the original version of Capital is rendered as the
“échangistes” in the Lachatre version.  However, Deleuze and Guattari say that “La société n’est
pas échangiste, le socius est inscripteur: non pas échanger, mais marquer les corps, qui sont de la
terre” (Deleuze et Guattari, 1972, p. 218, my italics). I have to refrain myself from going deeper
into an interesting problematic that contains a difference between possession and inscription.  But,
there is one thing at least that I have to quickly mention here.  For instance, Marx says as follows:
“Men have often made man himself into the primitive material of money [ursprünglichen
Geldmaterial], in the shape of the slave, but they have never done this with the land and soil
[Grund und Boden].  Such an idea could only arise in a bourgeois society” (C1, p. 183).  This
statement, which seems rather abrupt in light of the context and tainted with a slight mistake seen
from the point of view of history, implies the modern significance of the commodification (separa-
tion) of labor power and land in the exchange process.  Still, this dictum is crucial and this
“inscription” is nothing but a means of capture [Fang] that is consistent through possession/prop-
erty.  For Marx argues that the “échangistes” mutually act their “Anfang” deed as commerce
according to “Naturinstinkt.”  Here, although “deed” is regarded as the “commencement,” it is no
longer so except that the problematic of property rights is dissolved in the course of the exchange
process.  Whereas Marx, interpellating Faust (it is also Faust-qua-clenched fist) who pretends to be
at a loss with these contradictions in order to dissolve them, invokes the “Anfang,” this “Anfang”
is always and already degraded and tarnished as merely a contaminating or heterogeneous com-
mencement waiting while being worn away33 to be reduced and annexed to “Besitz” (always and
already about to become “Eigentum/property”) which tacitly mortgages the capitalist commodity.
In this respect, the second commencement is given a position that dangerously supplements the
first, while being clandestinely supplemented by the third. 
We, still after Marx, have to look into how the plural “Anfang” works.  Here, devices are
deployed which are expected to actually prove/watch [bewähren/bewahren] that the capitalist
commodity, based upon the deed of exchange, is the only proper/lawful [gültig] commencement.
Goethe, and Marx, describes in the following order the bewilderment of Faust who pretends to be
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perplexed and is advised to “descend” by Mephistopheles. Here, I would argue for a secret meta-
morphosis or transfer of the coup/Faust of the “Anfang” in Faust.  But why should Marx resort to
Goethe, even rhetorically?  The metamorphosis of the “Anfang” (or a pilgrimage of the instituted
“bewilderment” qua aporia) is firstly the word [Wort], secondly meaning/mind [Sinn], thirdly
power [Kraft], and lastly the deed [Tat]. 
In Faust, we read:
Geschrieben steht: »Im Anfang war das Wort!«
Hier stock ich schon! Wer hilft mir weiter fort?
Ich kann das Wort so hoch unmöglich schätzen,
Ich muß es anders übersetzen, Wenn ich vom Geiste recht erleuchtet bin.
Geschrieben steht: Im Anfang war der Sinn.
Bedenke wohl die erste Zeile,
Daß deine Feder sich nicht übereile!
Ist es der Sinn, der alles wirkt und schafft?
Es sollte stehn: Im Anfang war die Kraft!
Doch, auch indem ich dieses niederschreibe, Schon warnt mich was, daß ich dabei nicht
bleibe.
Mir hilft der Geist! Auf einmal seh ich Rat Und schreibe getrost: Im Anfang war die Tat!
As is well-known, it was Martin Luther who translated the first phrase of Evangelium
Secundum Johannem written in Greek “Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος” as “Im Anfang war die Wort,”
which provokes this passage in Faust.  What is remarkable is that the metamorphosing sequence
from “Logos” to “Wort,” “Wort” to “Sinn,” “Sinn” to “Kraft,” and “Kraft” to “Tat” is an impreg-
nable return in the name of the commencement. In other words, it is the Hegelian
“Vorwärtsschreiten/Rückwärtsgehen” and the Marxian “Reise wieder rückwärts” (see Marx,
1976b, pp. 21ff.). In the capitalist system it is the return to “logos/ratio[nality]” 34 as money/state
qua equivalent form through exchange.35
In the translation [Übertragung] from logos [λόγος] to word [Wort], there seems to be no
essential change in terms of meaning, but from word [Wort] to meaning/mind [Sinn, that which is
understood], translation or overpositing [Übersetzung] is employed in an attempt to build a layer
of meaning over the word and rewrite it as a stream of metonymy. Then power [Kraft], and, final-
ly, deed [Tat] emerge.  Marx defines this last “deed [Tat]” as the commercial deed, namely,
exchange. By way of unsheathing (Spivak, 1977) the palimpsests of contradictions he himself had
posited, he insists on his ability to dissolve this difficulty by saying that this deed is every time and
everywhere.  It is a deed of decomposing the logos/principio as money (ratio[nality] qua integer)
into the elements of “Warensprache”/human-meaning/mind [Wort-Sinn]. The commodity
exchange is institutionalized by legal rights (property rights) [Kraft] discrete from violence
[Gewalt] and derived from “Wort-Sinn.”  Herein the word/meaning forwardly [vorwärts] retro-
gresses to the exchange or deed in order to sanction the first commencement. The establishment of
a sociality (civil society) backed not by violence but by legal rights is described as the problematic
of state/property rights.  So it is that in a phrase that follows the “Anfang,” Marx connects this
deed to money as the equivalent form that social reciprocity alienates in the end, and says:
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The social action of all other commodities, therefore, sets apart [schließen (i.e.,
shuts/squeezes out)] the particular commodity in which they all represent their values.
The natural form of this commodity thereby becomes the socially recognized
[gesellschaftlich gültig] equivalent form.  Through the agency of the social process it
becomes the specific social function of the commodity which has been set apart to be the
universal equivalent.  It thus becomes – money (C1, p. 180-81).
At last we are given the “universal equivalent.”  Now the capitalist commodity is allowed to
organize society, by the deed, as the sole “Subjekt-als-Substanz” or as the “universal” being not
only based upon reciprocity but also because of a bestowed legality. It is allowed to be the com-
modity as commencement that buttresses money as the One (being always and already anticipated
to transform into another One, capital) arrogated to have a unique social function.  Therefore
Marx, quoting the Apocalypse of John, calls it the “beast [bestiae]” and gives it a name “number
[numeren];” which implies that society (the socius) is a place/cause/relation/power/violence [An-
Fang] captured by the exchange/deed that formally supports the capitalist commodity, namely, the
Anfang.  The second commencement that emerges in the process of exchange is annexed to the first
as an ad/e-vent that has always already been realized/deeded, and therefore crossed out and van-
ished.  This certain ad/e-vent, which occurred at and as the Anfang, thus returns to the first com-
mencement, a pilgrimage [Rückwärtsbewegung] from the first commencement to the other two,
step by step – from logos to word, from word to meaning, and from meaning to power/the legal
rights concomitant with deed/commerce.  This is the deed/capture through a superficial conjunc-
tion of the “forme vide” (Deleuze et Guattari, 1972, p. 220). Here, while the state comes ex nihilo
to occupy the empty form, the capitalist commodity seeks to close the circle by describing this
coming as a deed indigenous to it with no outside(s). 
5. We, the Defective Commodity-Beings
The tragic wonder will then be greater than if they happened of them-
selves or by accident; for even coincidences are most striking when
they have an air of design (Aristotle, Poetics, 1452a)
The Messiah will come only when he is no longer necessary; he will
come only on the day after his arrival; he will come, not on the last
day, but on the very last (Kafka, The Coming of the Messiah)
The first epigraph coincides with the Marx who speaks of the persuasiveness of the plural
commencement.  Commencements are the most surprising “ad hominem” when they are created as
contingencies under a certain aura of design, thus they are called the Messiah (Publius Vergilius
Maro) since their return is (pre-supposed to be) always already complete(d)/finished in the sense
that it always already remains in the commencement and tarries on and on there.  Therefore the
Kafka offers hope to us defective commodity-beings who are and collectively is ostracized and
swallowed as contentless form.  For, inasmuch as the return always already remains in the com-
mencement, we, the defective beings in the names of commodities and capital are always already
arrived as a literally ontic commencement, which therefore requires of us an ontological investiga-
tion. 
Upon shifting from money’s transformation into capital to the production of surplus-value,
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Marx writes a famous passage, which depicts how «we, the defective commodity-beings» contin-
ue(s) to haunt the superficial circulation in production, from the negative side, as the unreason
prior to a capitalist factice of the dichotomy of rationality and irrationality, to which Deleuze gives
a clear image.
Marx comes first:
The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries the sale and pur-
chase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the
exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer
and seller of a commodity, let us say of labour-power, are determined only by their own free
will. Their contract is the final result in which their joint will finds a common legal expres-
sion. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of
commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each looks only
to what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to his own advantage (C1, p. 280).
Deleuze follows:
Nous n’employons pas les terms «normal», «abnormal».  Toutes les sociétés sont à la fois
rationnelles et irrationanelles.  Elles sont forcément rationnelle par leurs mécanismes, leurs
rouages, leurs systèmes de liason, et même par la place qu’elles assignent à l’irrationnel.
Pourtant tout cela présuppose des codes ou des axiomes qui ne sont pas le produit du hasard,
mais qui n’ont pas davantage une rationalité intrinsèque.  C’est comme dans la théologie: tout
est tout à fait rationnel si l’on se donne le péche, l’immaculée conception, l’incarnation.  La
raison, c’est toujours une région taillée dans l’irrationnel.   Pas du tout à l’abri de l’irrationnel,
mais une région traversée par l’irrationnel, et seulement définie par un certain type de rap-
ports entre facteurs irrationnels.  Au fond de toute raison, le délire, la dérive.  Tout est ration-
nel dans le capitalisme, sauf le capital ou le capitalisme.  Un mécanisme bousier, c’est tout à
fait rationnel, on peut le comprendre, l’apprendre, les capitalistes savent s’en servir, et pour-
tant c’est complètement délirant, c’est dément.  C’est en ce sens que nous disons: le rationnel,
c’est toujours la rationalité d’un irrationnel. Il y a quelque chose qu’on n’a pas assez remar-
qué dans Le Capital de Marx: à quel point il est fasciné par les mécanismes capitalistes, préci-
sément parce que, à la fois, c’est dément et ça marche très bien (Deleuze, 2002, pp. 365-6)
The Benthamite paradise is the genuine world of the first commencement, which is not just a
“Warenwelt” but an already and always “Kapitalwelt” from the outset. The state is already and
inextricably at work there.  The commencement called the capitalist commodity is given ostensible
autonomy by the single and double commodification of labor power and land, yet in Bentham it is
always suffering from the other two defective commencements that continue to return as a ghost
[Geist], which I would call ontic class consciousness.  Why in Bentham?  Because we, the forced
owners of commodified labor power, can proudly continue to be the ontic as well as ontological
“Fehler” to the commencement called the capitalist commodity.  «We, the defective commodity-
beings» collectively become ghost [Geist] and always already or cyclically return to haunt the par-
adise of Bentham. Those who boast of being in a unique commencement are well aware of this but
merely strive to cross it out in moments called cyclical crises.  Therefore, «we, the defective com-
modity-beings» (hand in hand with the land that now turns out to be fictitious capital) have to
donate memory to the nightmare – and this from the porous space that is absolutely deterritorial-
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ized (made into smooth space) and escapes reterritorialization (logicalization).  
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